Social Security is a Þnancial asset whose 'purchase' is compulsory for most working individuals. This paper shows that the return on Social Security during the individual's working lifetime is related to the rate of change of aggregate labor income. If an individual's labor income is strongly related to aggregate labor income, then the Social Security asset is a particularly unattractive asset. In this situation, the individual would beneÞt from a reformed Social Security system that would permit investment of retirement funds in other Þnancial assets. This paper investigates how this aspect of Social Security risk varies across groups of individuals who differ according to gender; education; race; and age. The main Þnding is that there are important differences across groups in this component of Social Security risk, as captured by the sensitivity of individual-level income growth to changes in the SSWI. This element of risk is most important for women, especially women who are young-to-middle aged and with more education. This analysis suggests that women would have more to gain, compared with men, from a reformed Social Security system. * David Arsenau provided excellent research assistance for this project.
Introduction
Social Security represents an important source of retirement wealth for most Americans. For the median retiree, Social Security represents 25% of total retirement assets and 49% of liquid retirement assets (assets that either yield cash, such as Social Security and pensions, or assets easily converted to cash, such as Þnancial assets and IRAs). 1 Social Security is even more important as a source of retirement income for individuals in the lower lifetime earnings percentiles. Further, the Social Security Administration reports that Social Security represents 40% of all income to the aged population, and it accounts for over 50% of income for two-thirds of "beneÞciary units" (couples or nonmarried persons). Further, Social Security is the only sources of income for 18% of the aged population. 2 Social Security is typically viewed as a very safe vehicle for retirement saving. In fact, a major criticism of proposals to reform Social Security to allow participants to hold Þnancial assets such as equities is that there is much higher risk associated with traded Þnancial assets, compared with the traditional Social Security system. A discussion of Social Security risk under the current system would probably focus on the uncertainty regarding future changes in eligibility and the rules for computing beneÞts. Yet there is an important, frequently overlooked source of Social Security risk that is related to the way that Social Security contributions are indexed, or "marked up" during an individual's working life. The Social Security system uses a measure of aggregate labor income, called the Social Security Wage Index (SSWI), to index individuals' contributions to the Social Security system. The rate of growth of the SSWI is a measure of the return on Social Security contributions during an individual's working life. This return is uncertain, since the future rate of growth of the SSWI is unknown. As with any other Þnancial asset, the average return and risk of Social Security will be important for portfolio construction for an individual during his working life. Because Social Security represents an important source of wealth, yet is not tradable in Þnancial markets, an individual will want to structure the tradable portion of his or her portfolio in a way that hedges, as well as possible, the risk arising from Social Security.
Although Social Security wealth is an important element of an individual's non- 1 These data are from the Health and Retirement Survey, as compiled by Gustman et al. (1997) and Gustman and Steinmeier (1998) . 2 traded wealth, by far the largest component of total wealth is an the individual's human capital, which is also nontradable. Baxter and King (1999) show that human capital is the dominant component of an individual's wealth for all individuals except those on the very brink of retirement. For most individuals,the value of human capital is 5 to 20 times as large as the individual's net worth; this ratio is larger for younger individuals, and is smaller for individuals over age 55. But even for these older individuals, human capital is still somewhat larger than net worth. Given that human capital and Social Security are both important nontraded assets, a key element in evaluating the riskiness of the current Social Security scheme will be the covariance between the return on Social Security (the growth rate of the SSWI) and the return on human capital (roughly, the growth rate of labor income).
In particular, the higher is the correlation between the SSWI and the individual's own labor income process, the greater will be the individual's interest in participating in a reformed Social Security system that permits investment of retirement funds in traded Þnancial assets that can help hedge this nontraded risk. This paper investigates how Social Security risk during the accumulation phase varies across individuals who differ according to gender; education; race; and age group. We do not focus on other factors that affect an individual's overall return to Social Security, such as the redistributive nature of the beneÞts formula; the existence of spouse and survivor beneÞts; and labor income during the retirement period.
The main Þnding is that there are important differences across groups in this component of Social Security risk, as captured by the sensitivity of individual-level income growth to changes in the SSWI. This element of risk is most important for women, especially women who are young-to-middle aged and with more education. This analysis suggests that women would have more to gain, compared with men, from a reformed Social Security system that would permit investment of retirement funds in other forms of Þnancial assets.
Many critics of Social Security reform object to privatization of Social Security accounts on the grounds that this would undo the redistribution inherent in the current Social Security system. This paper does not address the redistribution issue, which is viewed as conceptually separate from the question of how to invest Social Security assets. If a redistribution scheme is desirable, say from richer workers to poorer workers, or from families with two working adults to families with one working 3 adult, then this redistribution can potentially be accomplished separately. 3 One possibility would be to tax contributions at the investment point and redistribute the proceeds. In any case, there is no fundamental reason to link the form of Social Security investment with the question of redistribution.
Although the paper focuses on the US Social Security system, the methods used here are broadly applicable to any retirement system under which individuals are required to make contributions during their working lifetime and the invesment of these contributions is not under the control of the contributor. As most national retirement schemes and many pension plans follow this model, the methods of analysis developed in this paper could be used to assess elements of risk associated with corporate pension plans and national retirement schemes in many countries.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the data, which are drawn from the PSID, and explains how the different sub-groups are structured. This section also presents summary information on the income process for these groups. Section 3 describes the risk/return properties of the Social Security asset, and the relationship between the SSWI and two measures of aggregate economic activity. Section 4 presents an illustrative model of the link between human capital returns and the returns on the Social Security asset. Section 5 contains the paper's empirical results on Social Security risk across socio-economic groups; Section 6 concludes with a discussion of the implications of our results for the potential beneÞts from a reformed Social Security system.
Data
The data for this study were taken from the Panel Study on Income Dynamics. The data are annual, covering the years 1967-1992. We removed data for individuals who had missing data or zero income in every year. Since the focus of this study is on Social Security risk during the accumulation phase (i.e., during an individual's working life), our sample does not include individuals who were older than 66 years in the last year of our sample. This left a sample of 1012 females and 632 males. An individual was classiÞed as "married" if they were married to the same person throughout the sample period; an individual was classiÞed as "single" if they were unmarried throughout the sample. We found that 575 of the females and 509 of the males did not change marital status during the sample period. If an individual's marital status changed during the sample period, this individual was not included in analyses stratiÞed by marital status, but was included in broader group analyses.
We report results separately for black and white individuals; there were too few individuals in the remaining race categories to perform meaningful analysis. In terms of education, individuals were assigned to one of three educational groups, corresponding to the highest educational level achieved by the end of the sample period. The Þrst group has less than 12 years of education (less than a high school education); the second group has exactly 12 years of schooling (a high school degree), and the third group has more than 12 years of schooling. Finally, we also study three age groups, where age is measured at the end of the sample period. The Þrst group has age less than 46 years; the second group covers ages 46-55; and the third group covers ages 56-65. Table 1 contains information on mean nominal income, income growth, and the variability of nominal income growth for the various groups. As is well known, the level of income is higher for men than for women; is higher for whites compared with blacks, and is generally higher for higher education levels. Single women tend to have higher incomes than married women. The average change in income is reported in the next-to-last column of Table   1 . Because many individuals had zero labor income in some periods, we cannot report the growth rate of income; rather, this column reports the change in the level of nominal labor income from one period to the next. The average income change varies quite a bit across groups, tending to be higher for single females compared with married females, and tends to be higher for groups with more education, although this effect is not strong. Finally, the last column reports the average standard deviation of income changes for individuals within the group. That is: the standard deviation of income changes was computed for each individual in the group, and then the average standard deviation across group members was computed; this measure of income volatility varies widely across groups.
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During their working years, individuals make 'contributions' to the Social Security system. SpeciÞcally, the individual and employer together contribute 12.4% of income up to a cap, which is currently $72, 600. The Social Security Administration indexes, or 'marks up,' the individual's contributions each year between the contribution date and the individual's retirement date. This is done so that beneÞts reßect the increase in the general level of wages between the particular working year in which the wages were earned (and contributions were made) and the retirement date. This indexation is reßected in the computation of the individual's "Average Indexed Monthly Earnings," or AIME. The AIME is constructed as follows. Let W t+j denote the national average wage index for year t + j, and let W t+R denote the national average wage index for the retirement year, t + R. 4 The worker's indexed
are computed as follows:
A worker who contributes $1 to Social Security will have that $1 'marked up,' according to the AIME formula (1), by the rate of change of the Social Security wage indexing series for each period between the contribution date and the retirement date. Thus, $1 at date t grows to:
Equation (2) shows that the nominal return during the accumulation phase to $1 'invested' in Social Security is the growth rate of the wage indexing series, since this is the amount by which the $1 is 'marked up' each period up to the retirement date.
We use the notation r SS t+1 to stand for the return on the Social Security asset between periods t and t + 1:
Using this notation, $1 at date t grows to:
The worker's average indexed monthly earnings is then the average over the individual's working life of W indexed t+j
The individual's Social Security beneÞt during retirement is a concave function of the individual's AIME. SpeciÞcally, the individual's "Primary Insurance Amount," PIA, equals 90% of the Þrst $477 of AIME plus 32% of AIME over $477 through $2,875 plus 15% of AIME over $2875. Through eq. (4) it is evident that the Social Security beneÞt depends on the rate of return on the Social Security asset during the accumulation phase.
From these calculations we see that Social Security may be viewed as a risky Þnancial asset, even during the accumulation phase, because the rate of return during this phase is a random variable.
Because the Social Security asset is a large part of an individual's non-humanwealth portfolio, we are interested in learning more about the covariance properties of Social Security returns with (i) a measure of aggregate economic risk; and (ii) human capital risk at the level of the individual. We study the Þrst of these below; the second is the subject of the next section.
To learn more about the covariance properties of the Social Security asset with aggregate measures of economic activity, Table 2 presents summary statistics for the growth rates of the Social Security Wage Index, nominal GNP, and per capital nominal labor income. We observe that these series display similar growth rates and levels of volatility, and are highly correlated with each other. SpeciÞcally, the mean growth rate for nominal GNP was 6.95 per year over the period the 1951-1996 period, while per capita income grew at 5.67% per year and the SSWI grew at 4.95% per year. GNP growth was somewhat more volatile than labor income growth or SSWI growth: GNP growth had a standard deviation of 2.73% per year compared with 2.45% per year for labor income growth and 2.12% per year for SSWI growth. The correlation between GNP growth and per capita labor income growth was 0.92, whereas SSWI growth had a correlation of only 0.71 with GNP growth and 0.72 with per capita labor income growth. Following Shiller (1993), we can imagine a claim to an asset called "aggregate GNP" or "aggregate labor income." The calculations in Table 2 suggest that the returns to the Social Security 'asset' during the accumulation phase bears returns that are highly correlated with the returns on "aggregate GNP" and "aggregate labor income." Thus, we see that Social Security does have an important element of risk during the accumulation phase, which we can view as domestic aggregate risk.
Human capital and Social Security: An illustrative model
This section presents a model of the link between Social Security returns and individual human capital returns during an individual's working lifetime. To simplify the present value calculations, we will assume that an individual lives forever. The period-t value of a individual's human capital, H t , is the present discounted value of current and future labor income, Y t , where we assume that the discount factor, ρ, is time-invariant:
To proceed, we must specify the statistical process for labor income and its relationship to the SSWI. We assume that the SSWI is a random walk, so that
. The Appendix provides empirical support for this hypothesis.
8 An individual's labor income, Y t , may depend on aggregate economic activity as well as individual-speciÞc factors. We let the aggregate factor be the SSWI, which we have seen is strongly correlated with GNP and with the national accounts' measure of aggregate labor income. Letting X t denote the individual-speciÞc variables, we specify that:
where
To simplify the analysis, suppose that X t is a single variable and is also a random walk, so that
The change in the expected value of period-t human capital will then be given by:
Substituting from (6)-(8), we have:
Equation (9) shows the effect of innovations in the permanent and temporary components of income on the revision in the valuation of human capital. Recall that ε t is the innovation in the stochastic trend that is identiÞed with SSWI; ν t is the innovation in the individual-speciÞc stochastic trend; and u t is the temporary, individual-speciÞc disturbance to income. Innovations in the stochastic trends dominate the revision in the valuation of human capital. For example, if an individual has a discount factor of ρ = 0.95, and has β = 1 (which would be the average beta for all working individuals, as long as the SSWI is exactly the same thing as average per capita labor income), then a 1% increase in SSW I t (ε t = 0.01) will be associated with a 20% upward revision in the individual's valuation of his human capital (1/(1 − 0.95) = 0.20). Even if an individual had a low value of β, say β = 0.30, a 1% increase in SSW I t would mean a 6% upward revision in the valuation of human capital (0.30/(1 − 0.95) = 0.06). By contrast, a 1% increase in the transitory component of income, u t = 0.01, will lead to only a 1% increase in the value of human capital.
This analysis shows that the permanent components of income changes will dominate revisions in the valuation of human capital; this will be true even if these permanent components explain, in a R 2 sense, very little of the time-series variation in income growth. To see this, imagine running a regression based on the Þrst-difference of equation (7):
where the operator ∆ indicates the Þrst-difference in the levels of a variable, e.g.,
The R 2 from the regression (10) would then be:
For many individuals, income ßuctuations may be dominated by individual-speciÞc, temporary inßuences. That is: 2σ 
Empirical evidence
This section presents empirical evidence on the time series behavior of labor income for various socio-economic groups, and documents the extent to which each group's labor income is related to changes in the SSWI.
SpeciÞcation of individual-level regressions
Following eq. (6), we specify the change in the SSWI as a random walk, possibly with drift, also allowing the possibility of a deterministic, as well as a stochastic trend, as follows:
. We modify eq. (7), to include a time trend. We specify that Y ijt , the date-t change in the labor income for individual i of group j, depends on SSW I t with a coefficient that depends on the individual's socioeconomic group, j:
). Finally, we modify the process for the individualspeciÞc variables to allow a time trend:
). We will further assume that there is no correlation between aggregate inßuences on the individual's wage, as reßected in SSW I t , and the individual-speciÞc inßuences captured in X ijt .
Because of the potential presence of stochastic trends combined with the unavailability of data on X ijt , equation (14) was estimated in the following form, where the ∆ operator indicates the change in the level of a variable, e.g., ∆SSW I t = SSW I t − SSW I t−1 :
where ζ ijt ≡ γ ij (∆X ijt − µ X ij ) + (u ijt − u ij,t−1 ).
Results
The results from the estimation of (15) are presented in Table 3 . For each socioeconomic group, the table reports the estimate of β j , the standard error of the estimate, and the R 2 of the regression. Since our speciÞcation of the income process assumes that the coefficient on ∆SSW I t depends on the group but not on individual characteristics, it may be of interest to know how much explanatory power there is in a regression of the change in group mean income, ∆Y jt , on ∆SSW I t :
The R 2 from this regression is reported as the last column in Table 3 . Table 3 shows that there are important differences across groups in the sensitivity of income growth to changes in the SSWI; there are also important differences in the extent to which growth in the SSWI explains income growth. Those groups that have the highest estimates of β j are white females, especially those with at least a high school education. For example, the estimate of β j is 1.73 (s.e. = 0.35) for married white females with more than a high school education and age between 46-55 years.
The corresponding number for single females with otherwise the same characteristics is b β j = 0.97 (s.e. = 0.18). There are many other instances of large positive estimates of β j within the white female subgroups. By contrast, black females tend not to have large estimates of β j : the exceptions are in those categories described above: individuals with more education and who are at least 46 years old at the end of the sample period. For example, married black females with more than a high school education have estimates of β j equal to 0.47 (the age 46-55 group) and 1.20 (the age 56-65 group). The sample sizes are small within this group, and the estimated standard errors are large, so it is less clear that there is a strong positive dependence of income growth on SSWI growth for these groups. Table 3 also reports estimates of β for larger groups, e.g., all married white females taken together, with a single β j estimated for the group. These results conÞrm the earlier impression that there is a strong, positive, and signiÞcant relationship between income growth and SSWI growth for white women, both married and single, but not for black women. This likely reßects that most of the black women in the sample are in the lower educational categories where the relationship is weaker.
Turning to the results for men, we Þnd that there is little evidence that income growth for men is systematically related to changes in the SSWI. This is surprising, since men are a larger share of the labor force; they account for most of labor income; and are more likely to be continuously employed than are females. Since the SSWI is a measure of aggregate labor income, it would have been natural to expect a strong, signiÞcant relationship in the mens' regressions. While there are positive coefficient estimates in some cases, notably for the more-educated white men (in parallel with the results for women), there is not the same strong systematic relationship that we observed for women. This is reßected in the group estimates for β j , which are all small and insigniÞcant (with the exception of the Single Black Male category, which contains only 1 individual).
There are also important differences across socioeconomic groups in terms of the explanatory power of SSWI growth for income growth. For the individual-level regressions for women (estimation of (15)), the R 2 s range from 0.00 to about 0.20.
Further, some of the largest values of the R 2 correspond to those cases for which the estimated β j are large and signiÞcant: speciÞcally, women with at least a high school education. The explanatory power of the individual regressions for men is much lower. Finally, the last column of Table 3 presents the R 2 for the group regression, eq. (16). There is a great deal of heterogeneity across groups in the extent to which SSWI changes can explain changes in group income, but once again the highest R 2 s occur for regressions of women's income, especially white women. For example, SSWI growth explains 83% of mean income growth for married white women with more than a high school education and ages 46-55. SSWI growth explains 80% of mean income growth for married white women, 50% of income growth for single white women, 58% of income growth for married black females, but only 25% of income growth for single black females. The results for the men show that the explanatory power of SSWI changes is lower than for the corresponding category for women (e.g., SSWI growth explains only 39% of income growth for married white males, compared with 80% for married white females). Further, there are only a few sub-categories for which there is a large group R 2 : most of these are sub-categories of married white males. Table 4 recomputes estimation of group-level β coefficients using data on all individuals who had some labor income during the sample period, i.e., not excluding those individuals who had a change in marital status during the sample period. 7 On the whole, the results from Table 4 reinforce the main impression gained from Table 3: women's labor income tends to have a component that is closely related to movements in the SSWI, while men's labor income is much less closely related to the SSWI. Labor income growth for white women, taken as a group, is strongly related to the SSWI, with an estimated b β = 0.62 with a standard error of 0.13. By contrast, the β for black women is only b β = 0.06. The estimate of β rises with educational attainment, from a low of β = −0.03 (s.e. = 0.17) for women with less than a high school education, to b β = 0.99 (s.e. = 0.22) for women with more than a high school education. The link between the SSWI and labor income is also stronger for younger women: the group with age less than 46 years at the end of sample has b β = 1.01
(s.e. = 0.28); the group aged 46-55 years has b β = 0.71 (s.e. = 0.15), while the group that is near retirement at the end of sample, ages 56-65 years, has a low estimate of b β = 0.12 (s.e. = 0.21).
By contrast, there are few sub-groups of men for which there is a positive, signiÞcant relationship between labor income growth and SSWI growth. In fact, there are only a few positive estimates of β. These groups are men with more than a high school education, with β = 0.47; those with ages less than 46 years at the end of the sample period (β = 0.56), and those aged 46-55 years (β = 0.70). However, the estimated standard errors of these estimates are much larger than for the corresponding women's groups, so that the estimated β coefficients cannot be viewed as signiÞcantly different from zero for any of the sub-groups.
The bottom panel of Table 4 computes estimates by sub-group when men and women are taken together. Given the disparity between the results for women's sub-groups and men's sub-groups, these results should be taken with a grain of salt. That said, the impression from this combined sample is that the groups with the highest sensitivity to SSWI growth are groups of individuals with more education and young-to-middle-aged individuals.
BeneÞts from Social Security reform
The empirical results of this paper suggest that there are important differences across socio-economic groups in the sensitivity of labor income growth to changes in the SSWI. First, we showed that labor income growth is approximately the rate of return on human capital and, second, the growth rate of the SSWI is approximately the rate of return on Social Security during the accumulation phase (i.e., during an individual's working life). Since human capital and Social Security represent two important, non-traded assets for an individual, a positive covariance between the returns on these assets is undesirable. To see why, consider the following. Suppose an individual experiences a period of low growth of labor income. If this individual has a large β on SSWI growth, then the period of low growth of labor income is likely to correspond to a period in which the Social Security return is low, i.e., the individual's contributions to Social Security will be marked up by a low percentage amount. That is: a period in which low income means a reduced ability to consume in the present and save for the future corresponds to a period in which the value of 14 the Social Security asset also grows by a small amount.
In fact, things can be much worse than this. The illustrative model of Section 4 and the empirical analysis of Section 5 showed that, if labor income growth and SSWI growth share a stochastic trend, this stochastic trend will dominate human capital returns. In this case, a negative innovation to this common stochastic trend means to a large, negative shock to the value of an individual's human capital (with a corresponding negative impact on current and future consumption) and at the same time corresponds to a large, negative shock to the expected future value of the Social Security asset, thus reducing expected future consumption from this source.
The Þrst lesson of portfolio theory is that individual's should hold diversiÞed portfolios, so that negative returns on one asset will tend to be offset by positive returns on other assets. But in the scenario just described, the individual has a portfolio of assets-human capital and Social Security-with highly correlated returns.
What can be done to improve this situation?
Ideally, the individual would like to hedge the risks associated with nontraded human capital and Social Security by establishing short (negative) positions in Þnan-cial assets that have returns highly correlated with the returns on these nontraded assets. In Section 3, we saw that returns on the SSWI are highly correlated with the growth rates of GNP and aggregate labor income. "Macro markets" of the type advocated by Robert Shiller (1993) would be useful as hedging vehicles for the risk associated with the traditional Social Security system. SpeciÞcally, an individual could sell claims on a "GNP index" in an amount equal to his or her Social Security contributions, and could use the proceeds to purchase other Þnancial assets that were less highly correlated with his/her nontraded human capital. Absent these macro markets, individuals could still beneÞt from Social Security reform that would allow the individual to choose the Þnancial assets in which contributions during the working lifetime would be invested. Individuals would no longer be able to create near-perfect hedges for Social Security risk, but at least they could invest their Social Security 'contributions' in assets whose returns were less highly correlated with the returns on nontraded human capital. Our results for disaggregated socio-economic groups suggest that women have the most to gain from this type of Social Security reform, since the evidence shows that women's labor income growth is most closely related to changes in the SSWI. By contrast, men's labor income growth appears largely unrelated to SSWI growth, suggesting that men may have less to gain from Social Security reform that permits investment in a broader range of assets.
A Technical Appendix
This appendix provides results for a Dickey-Fuller test of the null hypothesis that the SSWI contains a unit root. Let X t denote the SSWI, either in level form or in natural logs; we will test both forms below. We ran the following regression, where t denotes a time trend, ∆X t−1 denotes the change in X from period t-2 to period t-1:
The order of the lag polynomial γ(L) did not affect the results, so we present the results only for a single lag. The null hypothesis is that X contains a unit root, implying a null of η = 1. If the null is true, there is a 10% probability of a t-statistic less that -3.24; there is a 5% probability of a t-statistic less than -3.60. The estimates of η and the corresponding t-statistics are given below. Note: Group regression is ∆YBAR(jt) = α(j) + β(j)∆SSWI(t) + u(jt), where ∆YBAR(jt) is the change in the mean income of the group. 
